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THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND
CITIZENS BY SEYLA BENHABIB (CAMBRIDGE: CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2004) 251 pages.'
BY SEAN REHAAG
2
In Rights, Benhabib takes on a pressing challenge facing
contemporary theories of deliberative democracy. How ought theories
prefaced on open-ended normative deliberations respond to the
boundaries of the communities in which such deliberations actually
occur?
Generally, deliberative democratic theory holds that an
institutional framework is legitimate when those affected by the
institution could reasonably be persuaded to be bound by it. As
Benhabib puts it:
[e]very person, and every moral agent who has interests and whom my actions and the
consequences of my actions can impact and affect in some manner or another, is
potentially a moral-conversation partner with me: I have a moral obligation to justify my
actions with reasons to this individual or to the representatives of this being.'
A serious challenge for such a theory, however, is that any
inquiry into the norms through which communities articulate their
boundaries leads to the dilemma that
a shared feature of all norms of membership, including but not only norms of citizenship,
is that those who are affected by the consequences of these norms and, in the first place,
by criteria of exclusion, per definitionem, cannot be party to their articulation.5
The issue that Benhabib seeks to address in this book is the
paradox that membership criteria pose for theorists of deliberative
[Rights].
2 B.A.(Hons), LL.B., B.C.L. The author is currently completing an S.J.D. at the University
of Toronto, focusing on the intersections between migration law and political and legal theory. The
author would like to thank Joseph Carens, David Dyzenhaus, Robert Leckey, Audrey Macklin, and
Phil Triadafilopoulos for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this review.
' For a comprehensive introduction to discourse theory, see e.g. Jurgen Habermas,
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. by
William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
4 Rights, supra note 1 at 14.
5 Ibid. at 15.
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democracy. In this examination Benhabib resists being pushed towards
either of two extremes. The first extreme holds that all criteria of
exclusion are unjust because they affect those who are not party to their
formulation. This leads to a radical "open borders" thesis6 that is
inadequate to the task of justifying any closure within which democratic
politics can take place. The other extreme Benhabib wishes to distance
herself from is the view of boundaries around communities as
historically contingent, morally neutral facts that are pre-conditions for
moral and political discourses; as such, these facts themselves cannot be
subject to democratic deliberative discourses.7
Benhabib attempts to carve out a middle ground between these
two positions. Benhabib says we can never entirely get around the
paradox of membership: norms of membership will always affect those
who have little say in their articulation. We can, however, require
communities articulating such norms to engage in self-reflexive
discussions that periodically reassess and modify exclusionary practices.
The aim of such discussions, which Benhabib calls "democratic
iterations," is to destabilize exclusions: "[W]e can render the distinctions
between 'citizens' and 'aliens,' 'us' and 'them,' fluid and negotiable
through democratic iterations."8
Benhabib's book represents a democratic iteration that aims to
increase the fluidity of membership criteria. This iteration focuses on
legal controls over migration and citizenship in affluent western states,
particularly in the contemporary European context. Drawing on the
philosophy of Kant9 as interpreted by Arendt," Benhabib argues that
membership criteria sit at a troubling intersection between human rights
norms and popular sovereignty claims. Benhabib suggests that where
most contemporary political philosophers who discuss membership
issues err is in attempting to resolve the tensions that arise at such an
intersection." Instead of seeking resolution, Benhabib advocates
6 See e.g. Joseph H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders" in Ronald
Beiner, ed., Theorizing Citizenship (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995) 229.
'See e.g. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
(see especially at 41ff); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
(New York: Basic Books, 1983) (see especially at 39ff).
' Rights, supra note 1 at 21.
9 Ibid., c. 1.
10 Ibid., c. 2.
" Ibid., c. 3.
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drawing on the rich pluralism found in sites of contemporary
controversies over membership to encourage democratic discourses that
can serve to problematize-but not simply erase-existing naturalized
exclusions. These struggles, according to Benhabib, hint at an
alternative to cosmopolitan calls for open borders on the one hand and
an entrenchment of communitarian closed democratic communities on
the other. This alternative is to be found not in either the end or the
entrenchment of citizenship, but in its disaggregation and
complexification. 2 Picking up on a theme developed elsewhere, 3
Benhabib provocatively proclaims that in contemporary pluralist
societies the combination of increased international mobility and the
disaggregation of citizenship has irreversibly led to a scenario whereby
"'the other' is not elsewhere."'1
4
From an examination of sites of struggle that flow from the
presence among "us" of "others," Benhabib concludes that while it
remains the case that theories of deliberative democracy require closure
around democratic communities, such closure must be subject to
ongoing critique in pluralist societies. As such, Benhabib advocates not
"open but rather porous borders." 5 In addition, Benhabib argues that
although democratic communities may justly regulate their membership
and admissions policies, such regulation must, at a minimum, accord
with a right to first admittance for asylum seekers. Furthermore, there
should be limits on discrimination that would permanently bar certain
people who are long-term resident aliens from citizenship, or would
deny membership on the basis of ascriptive features of their identity
such as religion, race, ethnicity, and gender.
Benhabib acknowledges that these conclusions will "for some ...
go too far in the direction of rootless cosmopolitanism; for others they
will not go far enough."' 6 However, what I found curious about this
book was that in spite of repeated insistence that we forge a middle
12 Ibid., c. 4 & 5. Examples of such sites are the noisy debate in France surrounding laicit6
and the hijab, and the discussions in Europe surrounding the right to non-citizen residents to vote
in local elections.
13 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
4 Rights, supra note 1 at 87.
"
5 Ibid at 221.
16 Ibid.
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ground between human rights norms on the one hand, and the ability of
democratic communities to establish their own boundaries on the other
hand, I felt that the author managed to go further than I was prepared
to follow-remarkably, in both directions simultaneously.
With respect to human rights norms, it is unclear whether
Benhabib appreciates just how radical the argument about the right of
first asylum actually is. In one of the more troubling passages in the
book, Benhabib states:
[S]ignificant developments in international law point in the direction of the
decriminalization of migratory movements, whether these be caused by the search for
refuge or asylum, or by immigration proper. 7
Unfortunately, Benhabib fails to substantiate this assertion with
any citation to the relevant developments mentioned. This is particularly
troubling because as those working in migration law in western states
over the past decades would attest, the trend seems to be entirely
shifting in the other direction. 8
All western states have adopted strategies to control movement
across their borders by criminalizing unwanted migration, the most
concerted of these efforts being directed precisely against asylum
seekers. The most common strategy is to establish visa requirements,
whereby any country which is perceived to be likely to generate flows of
refugee claimants is added to a list of countries whose citizens must
request a visa while abroad in order to successfully seek admission at the
border. Of course, any visa applicant who is suspected of potentially
making a refugee claim on arrival is denied a visa. The state then
imposes penalties on any transportation company which provides
passage to individuals without the relevant visas, imposes criminal
sanctions on those who assist asylum seekers in circumventing the
combined visa requirement/carrier sanctions program, and establishes
complex enforcement and surveillance mechanisms to give effect to such
programs, mechanisms which often include, the use of military force.
The result is that most asylum seekers in western states arrive at their
destination through criminal misrepresentation in visa applications with
1l Ibid. at 68.
S See generally Marc L. Miller, "The 2002 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium -
Immigration Law: Assessing New Immigration Enforcement Strategies and the Criminalization of
Migration: Introduction" (2002) 51 Emory L.J. 963.
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or without the assistance of a criminal human smuggling network that
procures false documents and that can also provide irregular
transportation. 9
Of course, there is nothing wrong with asserting that these
common contemporary practices with respect to the criminalization of
asylum seeking cannot be justified within a theory of deliberative
democracy. To the contrary, I feel that we should discard any theory
that does not object to such underhanded strategies used to avoid
incurring obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.2° However, it is important to acknowledge that actual respect
for the right of first asylum that Benhabib advocates would impose
substantial burdens on western, states-burdens that states, by
criminalizing asylum seeking, have indicated that they are simply
unwilling to accept. In such a context Benhabib must offer alternatives
in how to proceed. How ought the theory of deliberative democracy
respond to this reality of long-standing and intractable injustice? What
are the sites and strategies that can best challenge such injustice? Failing
to ask these questions, and worse, failing to acknowledge the scope of
the problem being confronted, risks leaving the theory largely irrelevant
to those asylum seekers with whom Benhabib claims to be concerned.
While Benhabib's under-appreciation of the scope of the
challenge faced by those concerned with justice in this area is
problematic, I found the converse problem in the analysis to be more
disturbing: In a bid to forge a middle ground between human rights
norms and the need for communities to carve out delimited spaces in
which to conduct their democratic politics, Benhabib carefully sets up
the questions which will be the subject of critical discussions about
19 For a discussion of interdiction, interception, and visa program/carrier sanction
techniques in Canada, see Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, "Interception and Asylum: When
Migration Control and Human Rights Collide" (2003) 21:4 Refuge 6; Marina Jim6nez "Tighter
Security Cited in Refugee-Claims Decline" The Globe and Mail (12 August 2004) A8. For a
discussion of similar programs around the world, see Bryan Paul Christian, "Visa Policy, Inspection
and Exit Controls: Transatlantic Perspectives on Migration Management" (1999) 14 Geo. Immig.
L.J. 215; Joan Fitzpatrick, "Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention" (1996) 9 Harv. Hum. Rts. J.
229 (see especially at 237); Jessica Howard, "To Deter and Deny: Australia and the Interdiction of
Asylum Seekers" (2003) 21:4 Refuge 35; Nils Coleman, "Non-Refoulement Revised: Renewed
Review of the Status of the Principle of Non-Refoulement as Customary International Law" (2003)
5 Eur. J. Migr. & L. 23; Areti Sianni, "Interception Practices in Europe and their Implications"
(2003) 21:4 Refuge 25; and UN HCR, 2000, 18th Mtg., UN Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP.17.
2028 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
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membership so as to minimize the degree to which these two types of
discourses conflict. In so doing, Benhabib presents the human rights
norms as far less critical of the boundaries of democratic communities
than they otherwise might be.
Benhabib argues that certain types of exclusion from citizenship,
including those based on race, religion, and ethnicity, are impermissible
according to any theory of deliberative democracy. Such exclusions
impinge upon the communicative freedom of those who are excluded.
To quote Benhabib at length:
[C]learly, reasons that barred you from membership because of the kind of being that
you were, your ascriptive and non-elective attributes such as your race, gender, religion,
ethnicity, language community, or sexuality, would not be permissible, because I would
then be reducing your capacity to exercise communicative freedom to those
characteristics which were given to you by chance or accident and which you did not
choose. ... However, criteria that stipulate that you must show certain qualifications,
skills, and resources to become a member are permissible because they do not deny your
communicative freedom."'
Thus, Benhabib sees nothing wrong, in principle, with the
practice of selecting immigrants through "point-system" programs, such
as the one currently in place in Canada.2" Now, let us set aside for the
moment that "qualifications, skills, and resources" could quite easily be
recast as socio-economic class (and its attendant complex intersections
with gender, race, and able-bodiedness), a status that is for the vast
majority of the world more ascriptive than the liberal presumptions
embedded in the above passage would have it. We should leave this
objection aside because of a deeper problem in Benhabib's analysis:
namely, the outcome of the democratic iterations seems to hinge on the
kind of question being deliberated.
If, for example, instead of having a conversation about the
justifiable bases on which new potential members may be screened for
admittance to my community, we were to inquire into why I have a claim
2 Rights, supra note 1 at 138-39.
2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2002-227, ss. 73-85. The point
system screens out the vast majority of those who might be interested in migrating to Canada, as in
order to obtain the minimum pass mark a potential skilled immigrant must generally demonstrate
fluency in English and/or French, a minimum of a Master's degree level of education, and several
years of work experience in a limited number of highly skilled professions. For an excellent review
of the point system, see Catherine Dauvergne, "Evaluating Canada's New Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act in Its Global Context" (2003) 41 Alta L. Rev. 725.
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to membership while you do not (ie. what makes it my community and
not yours? what gives me the authority to make the determination about
exclusion and not you?), the discussion would proceed along rather
different lines. Such democratic deliberations would quickly have to
confront the reality that the vast majority of citizens of common law
states (including Australia, Canada, Britain, and the United States) have
a claim to citizenship on the basis of place of birth, based on the
principle of jus soli23 In such a context, if the status which puts me in a
position to determine whether or not you, who do not enjoy similar
status, can continue to be justly excluded is itself distributed on the basis
of an ascriptive social or biographical feature, then does not such a
starting place for our conversation already violate "the communicative
freedom of human beings qua human beings"?
24
Let us take a parallel example. Suppose a state were to establish
a two-track citizenship system. In such a system all people belonging to
one race-would receive automatic citizenship. Those of another race are
able to apply - for citizenship on the basis of clearly articulated
qualifications and skills that will assure those who already enjoy
citizenship that the inclusion of these particular persons belonging to
the other race will work to their advantage. If all we discuss in our
democratic iterations is whether or not the particular criteria that apply
to the second track to citizenship can be justified, then some liberal
theories may well conclude that such a system is acceptable. If, however,
we discuss the existence of the two-track system to begin with, then the
practice would be viewed as highly problematic.
Of course, there may be important differences between race and
place of birth. It is important to acknowledge, however, that the starting
point for our conversations about the rights of others in Benhabib's
analysis is, at least for countries such as Canada, a community in which
membership is accorded for the most part on the basis of place of birth.
Any democratic discourse theory that is troubled by distributions of life
chances according to ascriptive social characteristics must confront and
23 For an extended discussion of some of the more troubling features of the principle of jus
solias it plays out in the contemporary world, see A. Shachar, Citizenship as Inherited Wealth: The
New World of Bounded Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) [forthcoming
2006].
' Rights, supra note 1 at 139.
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defend such a starting point when it queries the ways that democracies
treat those they construct as "outsiders."
In summary, then, I find Benhabib's book to be an interesting
and effective "conversation starter" for democratic iterations on
membership. Benhabib's basic insight that it is unhelpful to talk about
citizenship in a way that seeks to resolve the tension between the global
human rights norms on the one hand, and attempts by communities to
carve out spaces in which to engage in democratic politics on the other,
is admirable. The insistence that, contrary to most prominent liberal and
communitarian theorists, the bounds of the community cannot be placed
outside discourses on justice, is refreshing. Most importantly, Benhabib
passionately and persuasively demonstrates that we no longer live in a
world where the interaction between states and non-citizens can be
imagined as a one-way unilateral projection of power:
[W]e need to move toward a vision of reflexive acts of constitution-making which are
cognizant of the fact that political entities act in an environment crowded with other
political actors, and that acts of self constitution are not unilateral gestures.5
In our future multilateral conversations on this topic, however, it
seems to me that in assessing the way we treat others, it is essential to
remember that "we" do not just encounter "others"-"we" and "others"
construct one another as such. And the way "we" go about that
construction should not be placed outside the bounds of "our"
democratic iterations either.
'Rights, supra note 1 at 175-76.
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